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ARTICLES 
 
REVISITING THE RECIDIVISM – 
CHAPTER 22 PHENOMENON IN THE  
U.S. BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 
Edward I. Altman* 
ABSTRACT 
This study finds that about 15% of all debtors who emerge as 
continuing entities from reorganization under Chapter 11 bankruptcy or 
are acquired as part of the process ultimately file for bankruptcy protection 
again. The recidivism rate spikes to 18.25% when considering only those 
firms that emerge as a continuing, independent entity. This highlights what 
appears to be a significant recidivism problem of our Chapter 11 system. I 
argue that the so-called “Chapter 22” issue should not be dismissed by the 
bankruptcy community as acceptable just because no interested party 
objected to the plan of reorganization during the confirmation hearing. 
Indeed, by applying the Z”-Score model to large samples of Chapter 11 and 
Chapter 22, 33, and 44 firms, highly different and significant expected 
survival profiles are shown at the time of emergence, whereby the bond 
rating equivalent of the multi-filing sample was CCC versus a BB- average 
profile for the single-filing Chapter 11 sample. I believe that credible 
distress prediction techniques can be important indicators of the future 
success of firms emerging from bankruptcy and could even be used by the 
bankruptcy court in assessing the feasibility of the plan of reorganization—
a responsibility that is embedded in the Bankruptcy Code. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Ever since Edith Hotchkiss and I first coined the phrase “Chapter 22,”1 
summarized most recently in 2006,2 the U.S. bankruptcy community has 
been debating the relevance and importance of the fact that some 
bankruptcy reorganizations under our Chapter 11 system go badly and the 
emerged company needs to file again, or, in some way, becomes seriously 
distressed in the not-too-distant future post-emergence.3  
Setting aside the frequency of refiling for a moment, the question of 
whether we should continue to debate the issue seems obvious, since § 
1129(a)(11) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code explicitly provides that one 
condition for the continuation of a plan of reorganization is that 
“[c]onfirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by the liquidation, or 
the need for further financial reorganization, of the debtor or any successor 
to the debtor under the plan, unless such liquidation or reorganization is 
proposed in the plan.”4 
Hence, there is a clearly defined specification of a “feasibility 
requirement” for Chapter 11 plans of reorganization. Of course, the 
requirement itself could be debated, as some have done in a recent Chapter 
22 symposium.5 In a 2009 paper with T. Kant and T. Rattanaruengyot, we 
argued that the courts and restructuring professionals should strongly 
consider the application of statistical methodologies for predicting 
corporate financial distress to complement the traditional tests now being 
used by restructuring specialists for their feasibility analysis.6 We provided 
evidence that one such technique, known as the Altman-Z-Score method, 
discriminates quite significantly between firms that file for Chapter 11 at 
least one time after emergence compared to firms that do not suffer this 
recidivism event, based on data from just after emergence.7 
                                                                                                                                       
 1. EDWARD I. ALTMAN, CORPORATE FINANCIAL DISTRESS AND BANKRUPTCY: A COMPLETE 
GUIDE TO PREDICTING AND AVOIDING DISTRESS AND PROFITING FROM BANKRUPTCY 10 (2d ed. 
1993); Edith S. Hotchkiss, Investment Decisions Under Chapter 11 Bankruptcy (Aug. 1993) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University) (on file with NYU Elmer Holmes Bobst 
Library). 
 2. EDWARD I. ALTMAN & EDITH HOTCHKISS, CORPORATE FINANCIAL DISTRESS AND 
BANKRUPTCY: PREDICT AND AVOID BANKRUPTCY, ANALYZE AND INVEST IN DISTRESSED DEBT 
(3d ed. 2006). 
 3. For commentary in the professional press about Chapter 22, see Gina Gutzeit & John 
Yozzo, What’s New with Chapter 22?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2013, at 36; Diane Vazza & 
Evan M. Gunter, ‘Til Debt Do Us Part: Serial Defaults in the U.S. Show Lower Recoveries and 
Higher Losses, S&P RATINGSDIRECT, Sept. 30, 2013, at 1; Diane Vazza et al., Till Debt Do Us 
Part: A Study of Serial Defaults, S&P RATINGSDIRECT, Nov. 10, 2010, at 1. 
 4. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (2012). 
 5. See Edward I. Altman, Presentation at the Barry L. Zaretsky Roundtable Discussion: 
Avoiding Chapter 22: Predicting Success in Chapter 11 (Nov. 18, 2013) (on file with author). 
 6. Edward I. Altman et al., Post-Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Performance: Avoiding Chapter 22, 
21 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 53, 63 (2009). 
 7. Id. at 53. 
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The purpose of this new study is to update and increase the sample size 
of firms to test our theory, to comment for the first time on the extent and 
frequency of Chapter 22, 33, and 44 filings in the United States, and to 
provide some additional tests about a number of relevant variables. 
The discussion of the magnitude and causes of the Chapter 22 
phenomenon is one that has taken several forms in the past, including the 
impassioned debate concerning the efficacy of the District of Delaware’s 
Bankruptcy Court. This debate was motivated by LoPucki’s book on how 
competition for big bankruptcy cases was corrupting the system.8 This was 
followed by Ayotte and Skeel’s defense of the system, particularly the 
selection bias of firms filing in different court venues and the more 
complicated capital structures of firms filing in Delaware,9 invoking 
Miller’s suggestion that the higher percentages of recidivism may be 
attributed to the complex and sophisticated Chapter 11 cases that gravitate 
toward Delaware and New York.10 LoPucki and Doherty’s rejoinder to 
Ayotte and Skeel’s models and conclusions followed.11 What was not 
debated or questioned was the astounding level of recidivism rates for cases 
filed in Delaware, and to a lesser extent in New York, compared to “other 
courts.” Indeed, LoPucki and Kalin, in an earlier study, provided statistics 
showing that companies emerging from bankruptcy reorganization in 
Delaware were far more likely to file a second bankruptcy than those 
emerging from other courts in the 1991–96 period,12 and in a later study, 
LoPucki and Doherty found that in that same six-year period, 42% of 
Delaware-reorganized companies that emerged as public companies filed 
again within five years, compared to 19% from New York’s Southern 
District and 4% elsewhere.13 From LoPucki and Doherty’s 2006 rejoinder 
to Ayotte and Skeel’s review, we observe that the sample size of their total 
filing statistics were relatively small, with 26 from Delaware, 16 from New 
York, and 56 from other courts (a total of 98 cases). My own statistics show 
that from 1991–96, there were 404 company bankruptcy filings that 
                                                                                                                                       
 8. See LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS 
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS (2005). 
 9. Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., An Efficiency-Based Explanation for Current 
Corporate Reorganization Practice, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 425 (2006) (reviewing LOPUCKI, supra 
note 8). 
 10. Harvey R. Miller, Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases and the Delaware Myth, 55 VAND. L. 
REV. 1987 (2002). 
 11. Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Delaware Bankruptcy: Failure in the 
Ascendancy, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1387 (2006). 
 12. Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The Failure of Public Company Bankruptcies in 
Delaware and New York: Empirical Evidence of a “Race to the Bottom,” 54 VAND. L. REV. 231 
(2001). 
 13. Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Why Are Delaware and New York Bankruptcy 
Reorganizations Failing?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1933, 1939 (2002). 
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emerged where the outcome was ultimately known (e.g., emerged, acquired, 
or liquidated) from that now somewhat remote period.14 
The purpose of this current Article is not to rekindle the earlier debate 
on the efficiency of one court versus others. Indeed, Lee presents evidence 
that “in recent years, the failure rates [i.e., recidivism] have been 
approximately the same for cases filed in Delaware and in other 
jurisdictions.”15 What is of interest here, however, is that the notion exists 
in many of the prior studies, as pointed out by Lee, that when the debtor 
corporation refiles after it emerges, this constitutes a reorganization failure, 
both in concept and cost.16 This is due to the direct and indirect costs of 
bankruptcies. Direct costs are estimated to be between 1–6% of the firm’s 
value,17 and indirect costs of bankruptcy, which I explored in an earlier 
study and based on my estimate of lost profits due to the expected 
probability of bankruptcy, range from 11–17% depending upon the 
industry.18 The reasons for the lost sales and profits are easily argued, 
revolving around issues like lost reputation, management focus distractions, 
lost employees, and the sales of assets and foregone investments. Of course, 
there may be substantial benefits to any bankruptcy filing, whether in the 
initial filing, as in the recent American Airlines case19 and subsequent 
merger with US Airways, or in the second filing of a firm, like Continental 
Airlines.20 Indeed, Ayotte and Skeel argue that, in some cases, an intensive 
and costly reorganization is not always the optimal strategy, but rather a 
quick, less costly restructuring, including prepackaged Chapter 11s, may be 
more efficient and that a subsequent liquidation or return to Chapter 11 may 
confirm the efficiency of foregoing an intensive reorganization the first time 
in Chapter 11.21 
My strong feeling is that the likely refiling of an emerging entity is not 
what the advisors or the court expect coming out the first time, and that a 
fast, low-cost, and accurate early warning system can make the refiling 
                                                                                                                                       
 14. Edward I. Altman, The Role of Distressed Debt Markets, Hedge Funds and Recent Trends 
in Bankruptcy on the Outcomes of Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 75, 
93 fig.7 (2014). 
 15. Ruth Sarah Lee, Delaware’s Relevance in Chapter 22: Who Is “Courting Failure” Now?, 
31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 443, 443 (2011). 
 16. Id. at 443–44. 
 17. LoPucki & Kalin, supra note 12, at 236 (“For a large, public company, the direct cost is 
probably about 1.5% to 6% of the company’s assets.”); Jerold B. Warner, Bankruptcy Costs: Some 
Evidence, 32 J. FIN. 337, 337 (1977) (finding that “the [direct] cost of bankruptcy is on average 
about one percent of the market value of the firm prior to bankruptcy”). 
 18. Edward I. Altman, A Further Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost Question, 39 
J. FIN. 1067, 1087 (1984). 
 19. In re AMR Corp., 730 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2013), petition for cert. filed, 82 U.S.L.W. 3510 
(U.S. Feb. 12, 2014) (No. 13-971). 
 20. In re Cont’l Airlines Corp., 901 F.2d 1259 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 828 
(1992). 
 21. Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 9, at 453. 
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likelihood a much lower probability without materially adding to the costly 
nature of a long, drawn-out restructuring. 
Part I provides updated numbers and commentary on Chapter 22, 33, 
and 44 filings from 1984–2013, as well as the success rate of Chapter 11 
plans of reorganization (PORs), before and after adjustments for recidivism. 
Part II looks at post-Chapter 11 performance and at the Z”-Score model’s 
updated results on the ability to forecast Chapter 22 based on data from 
emergence and one year post-emergence. The final Part discusses the 
Article’s empirical findings and provides some conclusions. 
I. CHAPTER 22 FILINGS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Figure 1 documents the number of Chapter 22, 33, and 44 filings for the 
thirty-year period of 1984–2013. In all, there have been 253 Chapter 22s, 16 
Chapter 33s, and 3 Chapter 44s for a total of 272 multi-filing events. Our 
list contains multiple filings where at least one of the filings involved a 
publicly held company.22 The number of multi-filings compared to total 
filings over the sample period averaged about 9% per year. The list of 
Chapter 33 and 44 filings can be found in Appendix A, while the list of 
multi-filing companies in 2013 can be found in Appendix B, including the 
dates and asset sizes of each filing. 
While 9% may or may not sound like a very large proportion of total 
filings, a more meaningful metric is the proportion of multi-filing entities 
among those firms that have emerged from Chapter 11 as a “going 
concern,” and therefore might need to file again. From our recent study on 
bankruptcy trends, we observe that between 1981–2010, there were 1775 
reorganized emergences and acquisitions in the Chapter 11 process, and 
from 1984–2013 there were 272 multi-filing events (Figure 1)—that is, 
15.3% of all potential outcomes (Figure 2).23 And if we examine just those 
firms that emerge from the bankruptcy process as a continuing, independent 
entity, the recidivism rate spikes to about 18.25%. This sizeable proportion 
of Chapter 11 filings could very well be classified as unsuccessful. As a 
minimum, we chose a three-year period after emergence to calculate the 
recidivism rate, hence starting the emergences in 1981 and ending in 2010, 
and the multi-filers as starting in 1984 and ending in 2013. We therefore do 
not capture any multi-filers in 1984 and thereafter which emerged before 
1981 and also no multi-filers in the future which emerged before 2011. 
Still, we believe that a recidivism rate of 15–18% is a fair estimate of this 
                                                                                                                                       
 22. Our source is primarily New Generation Research, Boston, MA. New Generation 
Research, Inc., BANKRUPTCYDATA.COM, https://www.bankruptcydata.com/About_Us.htm (last 
visited Apr. 11, 2014). We also utilize the NYU Salomon Center Bankruptcy database. 
 23. EDWARD I. ALTMAN & BRENDA J. KUEHNE, NYU SALOMON CTR., DEFAULTS AND 
RETURNS IN THE HIGH-YIELD BOND AND DISTRESSED DEBT MARKET: THE YEAR 2013 IN 
REVIEW AND OUTLOOK (2014). We have included in our multi-filer total those few firms acquired 
in the Chapter 11 process that subsequently filed again. 
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phenomenon and a substantial issue that should be addressed by the 
bankruptcy community, especially since the existing Code is currently 
being evaluated by practitioners and academics again.24 
FIGURE 1. U.S. CHAPTER 22, 33, AND 44 FILING STATISTICS, 1984–2013 
Year 
Chapter 
22sa 
Chapter 
33sa 
Chapter 
44sa 
Total 
Chapter 11 
Filings 
% Multiple 
Filers 
 
1984–1989 18 0 0 788 2.28  
1990 10 0 0 115 8.70  
1991 9 0 0 123 7.32  
1992 6 0 0 91 6.59  
1993 8 0 0 86 9.30  
1994 5 0 0 70 7.14  
1995 9 0 0 85 10.59  
1996 12 2 0 86 16.28  
1997 5 0 0 83 6.02  
1998 2 1 0 122 2.46  
1999 10 0 0 145 6.90  
2000 12 1 0 179 7.26  
2001 17 2 0 263 7.22  
2002 11 0 1 220 5.45  
2003 17 1 0 172 10.47  
2004 6 0 0 92 6.52  
2005 9 1 0 86 11.63  
2006 4 0 0 66 6.06  
2007 8 1 0 78 11.54  
2008 19 0 0 138 13.77  
2009 18 1 1 211 9.48  
2010 10 1 0 106 10.38  
2011 5 2 0 86 8.14  
2012 12 1 0 87 14.94  
2013 11 2 1 71 19.72  
Totals 253 16 3 3649 9.05 Average, Annual 
     7.45 Average, Overall 
aMust have been a public company at the time of one of the filings. 
Sources: THE BANKRUPTCY YEARBOOK & ALMANAC (Christopher McHugh & Kerry Mastroianni eds., 
annually); ALTMAN & HOTCHKISS, supra note 2. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
 24. The American Bankruptcy Institute has appointed twenty-two commissioners and thirteen 
advisory committees to hold hearings on possible revisions to the existing Bankruptcy Code. Their 
suggested changes are expected soon. See Press Release, Am. Bankr. Inst., Leading Scholars to 
Present Research and Proposals for Potential Chapter 11 Reforms at the ABI-Illinois Symposium 
on Chapter 11 Reform on April 3–5 (Feb. 27, 2014), available at http://news.abi.org/press-
releases/leading-scholars-to-present-research-and-proposals-for-potential-chapter-11-reforms-a. 
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FIGURE 2. PERCENT OF CHAPTER 11 PUBLIC COMPANY EMERGENCES 
AND ACQUISITIONS THAT LATER RESULT IN A CHAPTER 22, 33, OR 
44 FILING, 1981–2013 
# of Chapter 22, 33, and 44 filings (1984–2013) 272 
# of emergences and acquisitions (1981–2010) 1775 
% re-filed after emergence or acquisition 15.24% 
% re-filed after emergence only 18.25% 
Sources: New Generation Research, Inc., supra note 22; compilation by E. Altman, NYU Salomon 
Center. 
 
Another issue is the time it takes for a Chapter 22, 33, or 44 to take 
place after the firm emerges from the prior bankruptcy. Figures 3a and 3b 
show the frequency of time to recidivism (in months). While the majority 
(56%) file again less than five years (60 months) after emerging from the 
prior bankruptcy, a sizeable proportion (44%) file again after being 
“solvent” for at least five years after emergence. There is also a sizeable 
proportion (22%) who file again within two years (24 months) of the 
emergence date. Some may argue that a firm that “lives” for more than five 
years after emerging is not an unsuccessful Chapter 11 and therefore less of 
a blemish on the bankruptcy process. This, in my opinion, is a debatable 
point. 
FIGURE 3a. TIME TO RECIDIVISM (IN MONTHS)a 
aBased on 232 bankruptcies, 1984–2013. 
Sources: New Generation Research, Inc., supra note 22; compilation by E. Altman, NYU Salomon 
Center. 
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FIGURE 3b. TIME TO RECIDIVISM (IN MONTHS)a 
aBased on 232 bankruptcies, 1984–2013. 
Sources: New Generation Research, Inc., supra note 22; compilation by E. Altman, NYU Salomon 
Center. 
A. SUCCESS AND RECIDIVISM 
In our recent discussion of trends in bankruptcy, we defined success of 
a Chapter 11 reorganization as “either an emergence from the bankruptcy as 
a continuing entity, or an acquisition of the assets of the debtor.”25 
Liquidations under either Chapter 7 or 11 constitute our “unsuccessful” 
outcomes.26 However, when an emerged entity has to file again (the 
recidivism problem), one could, and I do, conclude that the original Chapter 
11 was not successful. In order to account for recidivism, we can adjust the 
65% success rate for all Chapter 11 cases involving publicly held 
companies, with known Chapter 11 outcomes (over 3000 cases) from 1981–
2013 (Figure 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
 25. Altman, supra note 14, at 96; see also ALTMAN & KUEHNE, supra note 23, at 13. 
 26. Id. 
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FIGURE 4. SUCCESS VERSUS NONSUCCESS IN CHAPTER 11 
REORGANIZATIONS (BASED ON KNOWN OUTCOMES), 1981–2013 
Sources: New Generation Research, Inc., supra note 22; compilation by E. Altman, NYU Salomon 
Center. 
 
Since 1981, through 2013, there were 272 cases of a Chapter 22, 33, or 
44 among publicly held firms. If we add those 272 multi-filers to the 
number of unsuccessful Chapter 11s (974) and subtract the same 272 multi-
filing cases from the initial cohort of successful ones, the percentage of 
successful Chapter 11s drops to 55.5% (Figure 4). While a majority of 
Chapter 11 filings still result in a successful outcome, the results are less 
impressive and, in my opinion, can be improved by a more diligent 
assessment of the recidivism potential by all parties involved. Figure 4 also 
shows the percentage of Chapter 11 filings for all “known” filing results 
and for those with greater than $100 million and $500 million in assets. 
Note that the success rate after adjustment for recidivism increases as asset 
size increases, but there is still a noticeable decrease in the success rate after 
adjusting for Chapter 22, etc. For the largest Chapter 11s, the success rate 
fell from 79% to 71% after recidivism adjustments. 
B. THE POSSIBILITY TO IMPROVE POST-CHAPTER 11 SUCCESSES 
As we will show, the troubling incidence of subsequent failures has 
accrued despite, as noted earlier, requirements—under the Bankruptcy Code 
enacted in 1978 and amended in 2005—that in order for a reorganization 
plan to be confirmed, the court must make an independent finding that it is 
feasible and further reorganization is not likely or needed; specifically, the 
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court must find that the plan is not likely to be followed by the liquidation 
or the need for further financial reorganization of the debtor, or any 
successors of the debtor, under the plan.27 In reality, however, unless there 
is convincing, opposing evidence of the lack of feasibility presented by 
interested parties, the bankruptcy court has decided that it has little choice 
but to sanction the plan as presented. 
The purpose of this study is not to debate the overall merits of Chapter 
11, especially since the Bankruptcy Code was substantially modified by the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005.28 The 
purpose is to analyze whether one can predict, with a reasonable degree of 
accuracy, which firms emerging from bankruptcy are more likely to suffer 
subsequent problems and file again under Chapter 22. In other words, can 
advisors, analysts, investors, and debtors—indeed, the court system itself—
avoid as much as possible the Chapter 22 phenomenon? 
Studies of post-bankruptcy performance have found that, while many 
firms restructure without the need for further remedial action, a striking 
number of cases require another restructuring through a private work-out or 
a second (or third) bankruptcy. For example, Edith Hotchkiss found that 
32% of a sample of large companies that had emerged as a public entity 
restructured again through a private or court-determined restructuring,29 
while LoPucki and Whitford, in their study of larger Chapter 11 filings, 
found that 32% filed again within four years of emergence.30 While some 
companies come out of the process still holding too much debt, most cited 
operating problems as the primary reason for their second filing.31 
Stuart Gilson found that leverage remained high after both out-of-court 
restructurings and Chapter 11 reorganizations, although it was considerably 
more elevated in the former.32 In a study of 58 out-of-court cases and 51 
firms that went through the Chapter 11 process between 1980 and 1989, he 
found that the median ratio of long-term debt (face value) to the sum of 
long-term debt and common shareholders’ equity (market value) was 0.64 
for firms in out-of-court restructurings and 0.47 for those in Chapter 11.33 
Hence, significant remaining debt on the balance sheets of reorganized 
firms could contribute to their refiling not too long after emergence. He also 
found that as much as 25% of his total sample had to file for bankruptcy or 
                                                                                                                                       
 27. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (2012). 
 28. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.  
109-8, 119 Stat. 23. 
 29. Edith Shwalb Hotchkiss, Postbankruptcy Performance and Management Turnover, 50 J. 
FIN. 3 (1995). 
 30. Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Patterns in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of 
Large, Publicly Held Companies, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 597, 608 (1993). 
 31. Id. at 609. 
 32. Stuart C. Gilson, Transactions Costs and Capital Structure Choice: Evidence from 
Financially Distressed Firms, 52 J. FIN. 161 (1997). 
 33. Id. at 167. 
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restructure their debt again.34 Heron, Lie, and Rogers came to a similar 
conclusion in that while the 172 firms they studied for the period 1990–
2004 had substantially reduced their debt burden in “fresh start” Chapter 11 
reorganizations, they still emerged with higher debt ratios than was typical 
in their respective industries.35 
Several studies assessed profitability and cash flows relative to 
comparable firms in similar industries. The eye-catching result was that 
more than two-thirds of those emerged firms underperformed industry peers 
for up to five years following bankruptcy, and in some studies, as many as 
40% continued to experience operating losses in the three years after 
emergence.36 Michel, Shaked, and McHugh show that projections provided 
by the bankruptcy reorganization plan for two-time filers (Chapter 22s) 
prior to their emergence from their first Chapter 11 are typically overstated, 
and these overstatements are more pronounced than for single filers.37 
On the other hand, the experience of some larger firms does show 
positive post-bankruptcy performance, and one of our studies shows excess 
stock market returns in the 200 days following emergence for those firms 
that came out of the process between 1980 and 1993 with publicly listed 
equity.38 While such positive performance seems to be cyclical, with poorer 
outcomes in the mid-to-late 1990s, a number of firms enjoyed spectacular 
returns after the surge in bankruptcies in 2001–02. Lee and Cunney found 
that investing in formerly bankrupt firms’ equities between 1988–2003 (a 
sample of 117 firms) resulted in a positive average 85% return relative to 
the performance of the S&P 500 index in the first twelve months after 
emergence.39 The volatility of these returns was extremely high, however, 
with only 50% of the stocks outperforming. The excellent results of many 
emerged firms in the 2003–05 period prompted one investment bank, 
Jefferies & Co., to create an index of post-bankruptcy equity performance: 
the Jefferies Re-org Index.40 This index is no longer in existence, however. 
A few additional studies show fairly positive, or at least not negative, 
post-bankruptcy performance. Alderson and Betker examined a sample of 
eighty-nine firms emerging between 1983 and 1993 and computed the five-
                                                                                                                                       
 34. Id. at 162. 
 35. Randall A. Heron et al., Financial Restructuring in Fresh-Start Chapter 11 
Reorganizations, 38 FIN. MGMT. 727 (2009). 
 36. E.g., Hotchkiss, supra note 29. 
 37. Allen Michel et al., After Bankruptcy: Can Ugly Ducklings Turn into Swans?, 54 FIN. 
ANALYSTS J. 31 (1998). 
 38. Allan C. Eberhart et al., The Equity Performance of Firms Emerging from Bankruptcy, 54 
J. FIN. 1855 (1999). 
 39. THOMAS J. LEE & JOHN CUNNEY, JPMORGAN, THE CHAPTER AFTER CHAPTER 11: A 
STRATEGIC GUIDE TO INVESTING IN POST-BANKRUPTCIES (2004). 
 40. Jefferies Expands Family of Indices to Include Unique Sets of Small- and Mid-Cap 
Companies, BUS. WIRE (Dec. 20, 2006, 10:35 AM), http://www.businesswire.com/news 
/home/20061220005578/en/Jefferies-Expands-Family-Indices-Include-Unique-Sets#.U1L1l2fD 
_5o. 
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year annualized return earned by the reorganized company, relative to the 
value that would have been received in liquidation and invested in 
alternative assets.41 Where the liquidation value was not available from the 
plan, the authors used the plan’s estimated market value at emergence.42 
They found that the reorganized firms’ annualized returns were not 
significantly different from those of the S&P 500 Index.43 
From a sample of 288 firms that defaulted on public debt, most of 
whom went bankrupt, Hotchkiss and Mooradian found in 1997, and also in 
their update (2004), that while 32% experienced negative operating 
performance in the year following emergence if there were no outside 
“vulture” investors directly involved with significant ownership, only about 
12% had the same negative experience when a “vulture” was actually 
involved in the restructuring.44 
II. AVOIDING CHAPTER 22 
To predict the performance of firms emerging from Chapter 11 
bankruptcy reorganization, we utilized a revised version of the original Z-
Score model, which was first developed for testing the credit scoring of 
emerging market firms45 and then applied in the United States, primarily for 
manufacturers but for other industrial groups, too. The logic behind this 
methodology is that if a model has proved credible and is accepted by 
academics and practitioners as a way of predicting corporate distress, it 
might also be effective in assessing the future health of firms emerging 
from bankruptcy reorganization, especially if the result one is trying to 
predict (and avoid) is a second filing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
 41. Michael J. Alderson & Brian L. Betker, Assessing Post-Bankruptcy Performance: An 
Analysis of Reorganized Firms’ Cash Flows, 28 FIN. MGMT. 68 (1999). 
 42. Id. at 69. 
 43. Id. at 74. 
 44. Edith S. Hotchkiss & Robert M. Mooradian, Vulture Investors and the Market for Control 
of Distressed Firms, 43 J. FIN. ECON. 401 (1997); Edith S. Hotchkiss & Robert M. Mooradian, 
Presentation at the Turnaround Management Association’s Advanced Education Workshop: The 
Performance of Firms Emerging from Chapter 11: Recent Evidence (June 15, 2004) (on file with 
author). 
 45. Edward I. Altman, An Emerging Market Credit Scoring System for Corporate Bonds, 6 
EMERGING MARKETS REV. 311 (2005). 
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FIGURE 5. Z-SCORE COMPONENT DEFINITIONS AND WEIGHTINGS 
Variable Definition Weighting Factor 
X1 
Working Capital 
1.2 Total Assets 
X2 
Retained Earnings 1.4 Total Assets 
X3 
EBIT 3.3 Total Assets 
X4 
Market Value of Equity 0.6 
Book Value of Total Liabilities 
X5 
Sales 1.0 Total Assets 
   Sources: ALTMAN & HOTCHKISS, supra note 2; Edward I. Altman, The Prediction of Corporate 
Bankruptcy: A Discriminant Analysis, 23 J. FIN. 193 (1968). 
 
In the original Z-Score model, (Figure 5), firms needed to be public 
entities since one of the variables, the market value of equity/total 
liabilities, requires the availability of publicly traded equity. In order to 
make the model more robust across all industrial groupings, as well as for 
privately owned companies, the Z-Score model was adapted: note that the 
revised model, called Z”-Score, has four variables, not five as in the 
original model; the Sales/Total Tangible Assets variable is removed and the 
coefficients re-estimated (Figure 6). In addition, we substitute the book 
value of equity for the market value (X4) in the Z”-Score model. 
FIGURE 6. Z”-SCORE MODEL FOR MANUFACTURERS, NON-
MANUFACTURERS, INDUSTRIALS, AND EMERGING MARKET CREDITS 
Z” = 6.56X1 + 3.26X2 + 6.72X3 + 1.05X4 
X1 
Current Assets – Current Liabilities 
Total Assets 
X2 
Retained Earnings 
Total Assets 
X3 
Earnings Before Interest and Taxes 
Total Assets 
X4 
Book Value of Equity 
Total Liabilities 
  Sources: ALTMAN & HOTCHKISS, supra note 2. 
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Bond rating equivalents (BREs) based on data from 1996 were chosen 
for our subsequent empirical tests (Figure 7). We have since updated these 
benchmarks, but for this study, the 1996 standard seemed appropriate. The 
equation used in the calculations was modified by adding a constant term of 
3.25 so as to scale the scores to a “D” rating equal to zero (0.0). Firms with 
Z”-Scores above zero have BREs in the non-default zones (AAA to CCC-). 
FIGURE 7. U.S. BOND RATING EQUIVALENTS BASED ON  
Z”-SCORE MODEL 
Z” = 3.25 + 6.56X1 + 3.26X2 + 6.72X3 + 1.05X4 
Rating Average 1996 Z”-Scorea 
AAA/AA+ 8.15 (8) 
AA/AA- 7.16 (33) 
A+ 6.85 (24) 
A 6.65 (42) 
A- 6.40 (38) 
BBB+ 6.25 (38) 
BBB 5.85 (59) 
BBB- 5.65 (52) 
BB+ 5.25 (34) 
BB 4.95 (25) 
BB- 4.75 (65) 
B+ 4.50 (78) 
B 4.15 (115) 
B- 3.75 (95) 
CCC+ 3.20 (23) 
CCC 2.50 (10) 
CCC- 1.75 (6) 
CC/D 0.00 (14) 
aSample size in parentheses. 
Sources: Compustat, Company Filings, and S&P. 
 
We will now explore the results of applying the Z”-Score model to two 
samples of firms that emerged from bankruptcy. One sample consists of 
Chapter 22s or 33s, (Figure 8); the other represents those companies that 
emerged from Chapter 11 and did not file a second time (Figure 9). 
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FIGURE 8. Z”-SCORES FOR CHAPTER 22s 
  COMPANY NAME 
EFFECTIVE 
DATE 
Z"-SCORE 
AFTER 
EMERGENCE BRE 
Z"-SCORE 
1-YEAR 
POST BRE 
RE-
FILING 
DATE 
PERIOD BETWEEN 
EMERGENCE & SECOND 
FILING 
 
YEARS MONTHS DAYS 
1 AMERICAN BANKNOTE 11/21/2000 0.34 D 0.35 D 4/8/2005 4 4 18 
2 AMES DEPT STORES 12/18/1992 4.74 BB- 6.31 BBB+ 8/20/2001 8 8 2 
3 ANACOMP 6/4/1996 3.72 B- 2.93 CCC+ 10/19/2001 5 4 15 
4 ANCHOR GLASS 11/25/1997 3.62 B- 3.73 B 4/15/2002 4 4 21 
5 ANCHOR GLASS 8/9/2002 3.61 B- 4.05 B 8/8/2005 2 11 30 
6 ATA HOLDINGS 1/31/2006 3.18 CCC+ 3.4 CCC+ 4/2/2008 2 2 2 
7 BRENDLE’S 12/20/1993 6.65 A 6.6 A 4/16/1996 2 3 27 
8 BRUNO'S, INC. 12/30/1999 1.33 D n/a n/a 2/5/2009 9 1 6 
9 COHO ENERGY 3/21/2000 1.71 CCC- -3.27 D 2/24/2003 2 11 3 
10 COMPOSITE TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION  10/31/2005 -1.01 D -0.86 D 4/10/2011 5 5 10 
11 CONSTAR INTERNATIONAL INC 5/14/2009 3.54 CCC+ 2.32 CCC- 1/11/2011 1 7 28 
12 DEX MEDIA 1/12/2010 2.55 CCC 2.56 CCC 3/17/2013 3 2 5 
13 EAGLE FOOD CENTERS 7/10/2000 2.49 CCC 3.45 CCC+ 3/25/2004 3 8 15 
14 EDISON BROTHERS 9/26/1997 4.19 B 2.85 CCC 3/9/1999 1 5 11 
15 EXIDE TECHNOLOGIES 5/4/2004 0.75 D 2.24 CCC- 6/10/2013 9 1 6 
16 FILENE'S BASEMENT, LLC (SYMS CORP.) 1/26/2010 8.56 AAA 6.32 BBB+ 11/2/2011 1 9 7 
17 FOAMEX INTERNATIONAL INC. 2/1/2007 1.50 D -0.18 D 2/18/2009 2 0 17 
18 GALEY & LORD 2/10/2004 -0.66 D 0.28 D 3/5/2004 0 0 24 
19 GLOBAL AVIATION HOLDINGS INC.  3/26/2009 3.63 CCC+ 3.75 B- 2/5/2012 2 10 10 
20 GRAND UNION CO 5/31/1995 2.81 CCC 1.9 CCC- 6/24/1998 3 0 24 
21 GRAND UNION CO 8/5/1998 3.41 CCC+ 0.76 D 10/3/2000 2 1 28 
22 HARVARD INDUSTRIES 8/10/1992 2.38 CCC 1.1 CCC- 5/8/1997 4 8 28 
23 HARVARD INDUSTRIES 10/15/1998 1.21 CCC- 0.8 D 1/16/2002 3 3 1 
24 HAYES LEMMERZ INTERNATIONAL, INC. 5/12/2003 4.44 B 4.47 B 5/11/2009 5 11 29 
25 HEARTLAND WIRELESS 3/15/1999 3.87 B- 5.25 BB+ 9/5/2003 4 5 21 
26 HOMELAND HOLDING 7/16/1996 4.73 BB- 4.18 B 8/1/2001 5 0 16 
27 HOSTESS BRANDS, INC 12/5/2008 -1.47 D n/a n/a 1/11/2012 3 1 6 
28 INSIGHT HEALTH SERVICES HOLDINGS CORP. 7/10/2007 -0.02 D 0.56 D 12/10/2010 3 5 0 
29 ITHACA INDUSTRIES 12/16/1996 7.21 AA/AA- 6.86 A+ 5/9/2000 3 4 23 
30 LAMONTS APPARELS 12/18/1997 2.83 CCC 2.16 CCC 1/4/2000 2 0 17 
31 LOEHMANN'S, INC.  9/6/2000 1.26 D n/a n/a 11/15/2010 10 2 9 
32 MCLEOD USA 4/18/2002 -2.77 D 3.42 CCC+ 12/16/2005 3 7 28 
33 MEMOREX TELEX 2/7/1992 -0.49 D 1.37 CCC- 2/11/1994 2 0 4 
34 MEMOREX TELEX 3/14/1994 0.62 D -1.3 D 10/15/1996 2 7 1 
35 ORMET CORPORATION 12/15/2004 
  
0.63 D 2/25/2013 8 2 10 
36 PAYLESS CASHWAYS 12/2/1997 5.19 BB+ 5.64 BBB- 6/4/2001 3 6 2 
37 PENN TRAFFIC CO 5/27/1999 4.39 B+ 3.73 B- 3/17/2005 5 9 18 
38 PILLOWTEX 5/2/2002 2.78 CCC n/a n/a 7/30/2003 1 2 28 
39 PLANET HOLLYWOOD 1/21/2000 -8.24 D -6.77 D 10/19/2001 1 8 28 
40 PLIANT CORPORATION 6/23/2006 1.78 CCC- 1.28 D 2/11/2009 2 7 19 
41 RYMER FOODS 4/7/1993 4.44 B+ 4.14 B 7/8/1997 4 3 1 
42 SALANT 7/30/1993 6.52 A- 5.8 BBB 12/29/1998 5 4 29 
43 SATELITES MEXICANOS, S.A. DE C.V.  11/13/2006 3.58 CCC+ 4.21 B 4/6/2011 4 4 24 
44 SILICON GRAPHICS, INC. 9/19/2006 -16.54 D n/a n/a 4/1/2009 2 6 13 
45 SMITH CORONA 2/28/1997 5.36 BB+ 3.92 B- 5/23/2000 3 2 25 
46 SOLO SERVE 7/6/1995 2.98 CCC+ 1.5 CCC- 1/20/1999 3 6 14 
47 SPIEGEL, INC. 5/25/2005 5.10 BB 3.88 B- 6/17/2009 4 0 23 
48 STEAKHOUSE PTNRS 12/19/2003 1.41 CCC- 1.19 CCC- 5/15/2008 4 4 26 
49 SUPERMEDIA, INC.  12/22/2009 3.26 CCC+ 3.38 CCC+ 3/18/2013 3 2 24 
50 TBS INTERNATIONAL PLC  10/12/2000 4.57 B+ 7.10 AA- 2/6/2012 11 3 25 
51 TODAYS MAN 12/12/1997 7.24 AA- 9.12 AAA 5/6/2004 6 4 24 
52 TOKHEIM 10/9/2000 3.9 B- -0.57 D 11/21/2002 2 1 12 
53 TRANS WORLD AIR 8/11/1993 -1.33 D 1.98 CCC- 6/30/1995 1 10 19 
54 TRANS WORLD AIR 8/4/1995 3.05 CCC+ 2.09 CCC- 1/10/2001 5 5 6 
55 TRICO MARINE SERVICES, INC. 1/19/2005 6.98 A+ 10.69 AAA 8/25/2010 5 7 6 
56 TRISM 12/9/1999 -2.06 D -1.02 D 12/18/2001 2 0 9 
57 UNITED MERCHANTS 8/16/1991 -1.51 D 0.63 D 2/22/1996 4 6 6 
58 US AIRWAYS GROUP 3/18/2003 2.63 CCC 1.84 CCC- 9/16/2005 2 5 29 
59 USG 4/23/1993 3.48 CCC+ 3.82 B- 6/25/2001 8 2 2 
60 WESTMORELAND COAL 12/22/1994 2.18 CCC -4.36 D 12/23/1996 2 0 1 
61 WHEREHOUSE 12/16/1996 7.59 AA/AA- 7.95 AA+ 1/20/2003 6 1 4 
           
 
NUMBER OF BANKRUPTCIES   60   56     YEARS MONTHS DAYS 
 
AVERAGE Z"-SCORE 
 
2.39 CCC 2.68 CCC AVERAGE 4 1 29 
 
MEDIAN Z"-SCORE 
 
3.02 CCC+ 2.70 CCC   
  
  
 
STANDARD DEVIATION  3.81   3.13           
Sources: Author’s compilation from Capital IQ data and Bloomberg. 
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FIGURE 9. Z”-SCORES FOR CHAPTER 11s 
 
 COMPANY NAME 
EFFECTIVE 
DATE 
Z"-SCORE AFTER 
EMERGENCE BRE 
Z"-SCORE      
1-YEAR POST BRE 
1 AMERCO 3/15/2004 4.78 BB- 4.39 B+ 
2 AMERICAN COMMERCIAL LINES, LLC 1/10/2005 5.02 BB 6.89 A+ 
3 ASARCO, INC. 12/9/2009 7.45 AA 7.62 AA+ 
4 ATLAS AIR WORLDWIDE HOLDINGS, INC. 7/27/2004 5.58 BBB- 6.61 A 
5 AURORA OIL & GAS CORP. 12/22/2009 5.72 BBB- 18.70 AAA 
6 AVADO BRANDS, INC. 5/19/2005 8.58 AAA 22.26 AAA 
7 BAYOU STEEL CORP. 2/18/2004 n/a n/a -13.06 D 
8 BOONTON ELECTRONICS 11/18/1994 7.67 AAA/AA+ 7.63 AA 
9 CAI WIRELESS SYSTEMS INC 10/14/1998 3.04 CCC+ n/a n/a 
10 CALPINE CORP. 1/31/2008 3.20 CCC+ 3.03 CCC+ 
11 CARBIDE/GRAPHITE GROUP, INC. 1/10/2005 4.98 BB 4.27 B 
12 CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC. 11/30/2009 n/a n/a 3.45 CCC+ 
13 CHEROKEE CORP 6/1/1993 4.00 B 2.09 CCC- 
14 CONSOLIDATED HYDROINC 11/7/1997 3.90 B- 4.81 BB- 
15 CORNERSTONE PROPANE PARTNERS LP 12/20/2004 n/a n/a 4.57 B+ 
16 DELTA AIR LINES, INC. 4/30/2007 3.74 B- 2.05 CCC- 
17 EL PASO ELECTRONIC 2/12/1996 4.36 B+ 4.75 BB- 
18 ELSINORE CORPORATION 2/28/1997 3.65 B- 4.18 B 
19 EMCOR 10/3/1994 4.03 B 4.38 B+ 
20 EMERSON RADIO 8/9/1994 5.42 BB+ 4.08 B 
21 ENERGY PARTNERS LTD. 9/21/2009 4.82 BB- 6.55 A 
22 ENTERGY NEW ORLEANS, INC. 5/8/2007 5.35 BB+ 5.88 BBB 
23 FANSTEEL INC 12/22/2003 3.21 CCC+ 2.83 CCC 
24 FEDERAL MOGUL CORP. 12/27/2007 5.21 BB+ 4.55 B+ 
25 FLAGSTAR COMPANIES INC 1/7/1998 2.90 CCC+ -0.44 D 
26 FOOTSTAR, INC. 2/7/2006 6.35 A- 4.41 B+ 
27 GANTOS 3/7/1995 6.58 A 6.17 BBB+ 
28 GENTEKINC 10/7/2003 4.51 B+ 2.19 CCC 
29 GLOBAL POWER EQUIPMENT GROUP 1/21/2008 6.92 A+ 6.77 A+ 
30 GLOBALSTAR, LP 6/29/2004 7.48 AA 9.40 AAA 
31 GRANT GEOPHYSICAL 9/30/1997 4.49 B+ 4.14 B 
32 HANCOCK FABRICS, INC. 8/1/2008 6.88 A+ 5.88 BBB 
33 HARNISCHFEGE INDUSTRIES INC 7/13/2001 5.70 BBB- 5.30 BB+ 
34 HAYES LEMMERZ INTERNATIONAL, INC. 12/16/2009 -3.18 D n/a n/a 
35 HEARTLAND WIRELESS INC 4/5/1999 6.11 BBB+ 5.01 BB 
36 HEXCEL CORPORATION 1/12/1995 4.83 BB- 4.45 B+ 
37 HVIDEMARINEINC 12/15/1999 3.69 B- 3.64 B- 
38 IMPERIALSUGARCOTX 8/29/2001 3.98 B 5.00 BB 
39 INTEGRATED ELECTRICAL SERVICES, INC. 5/15/2006 6.57 A 7.01 AA- 
40 INTERNATIONAL WIRE GROUP, INC. 10/20/2004 n/a n/a 6.32 BBB+ 
41 IPCS, INC. 7/20/2004 4.35 B+ 4.30 B 
42 KAISER ALUMINUM CORP. 7/6/2006 6.62 A 10.36 AAA 
43 KAISER GROUP INTERNATIONAL INC 12/18/2000 6.94 A+ 4.23 B 
44 KASH N’KARRY 12/12/1994 4.20 B 4.60 B+ 
45 KEYSTONE CONSOLIDATED INDUSTRIES, INC. 9/1/2005 4.31 B 6.25 BBB+ 
46 KITTY HAWK INC 9/30/2002 6.19 BBB+ 7.39 AA 
47 KRYSTAL COMPANY 4/22/1997 3.46 CCC+ 9.41 AAA 
48 LAIDLAW INC 2/28/2003 4.40 B+ 5.55 BBB- 
49 LEAP WIRELESS INTERNATIONAL, INC. 8/16/2004 6.07 BBB+ 5.67 BBB- 
50 LEAR CORP. 11/9/2009 5.23 BB+ 6.18 BBB+ 
51 LOEHMANN’S HOLDINGS INC DE 10/31/2000 5.48 BBB- 6.24 BBB+ 
52 LOEWEN GROUP INT’L INC 1/2/2002 3.09 CCC+ 3.62 B- 
53 LONE STAR INDUSTRIES 3/1/1994 5.16 BB+ 6.19 BBB+ 
54 LORAL SPACE & COMMUNICATIONS LTD. 11/22/2005 4.75 BB- 4.86 BB 
55 MAGELLAN HEALTH SERVICES, INC. 1/5/2004 6.09 BBB+ 7.89 AA+ 
56 MAGNACHIP SEMICONDUCTOR, LLC 11/9/2009 6.25 BBB+ 7.84 AA+ 
57 MTS, INC. 3/19/2004 6.76 A+ 6.14 BBB+ 
58 NOTHWESTERN CORP. 11/2/2004 4.10 B 3.86 B- 
59 NRG ENERGY 11/24/2003 3.75 B- 1.22 CCC- 
60 NTK HOLDINGS, INC. (NORTEK, INC.) 12/17/2009 n/a n/a 4.66 BB- 
61 OGLEBAY NORTON CO. 1/31/2005 4.22 B 5.30 BB+ 
62 ONEIDA LTD. 8/30/2006 -0.95 D n/a n/a 
63 OWENS CORNING 10/31/2006 4.41 B+ 5.09 BB 
64 PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO. 4/12/2004 4.15 B 3.88 B- 
65 PARAGON TRADE BRANDS INC 1/28/2000 5.72 BBB- n/a n/a 
66 PATHMARK STORES INC 9/18/2000 4.12 B 2.47 CCC 
67 PEREGRINE SYSTEMS INC 7/18/2003 4.28 B 3.47 CCC+ 
68 PETROLEUM GEO SERVICES ASA 10/21/2003 4.32 B 5.48 BBB- 
69 PHONE TEL 11/18/1999 3.54 B- 4.30 B 
70 PILGRIM'S PRIDE CORP. 12/28/2009 4.79 BB- 5.92 BBB 
71 POLYMRE GROUP INC 1/3/2003 2.35 CCC 2.09 CCC- 
72 PRIMUS TELECOMMUNICATION GROUP, INC. 7/1/2009 3.75 B- 3.57 B- 
73 RCN CORP. 12/22/2004 n/a n/a 3.64 B- 
74 REDBACK NETWORKS, INC. 1/2/2004 6.49 A- 6.27 BBB+ 
75 REGUS PLC 1/12/2004 2.42 CCC 3.22 CCC+ 
76 SAFETY COMPONENTS INT’L 10/11/2000 6.13 BBB+ 5.13 BB+ 
77 SEITEL, INC. 7/2/2004 3.68 B- 5.38 BB+ 
78 SOLUTIA, INC. 2/28/2008 3.93 B- 3.86 B- 
79 SOUTHERN MINERAL CORP 8/1/2000 5.38 BB+ n/a n/a 
80 SPECTRUM BRANDS, INC. 8/28/2009 4.68 BB- 4.65 BB- 
81 STAGE STORES INC NV 8/24/2001 9.98 AAA 11.78 AAA 
82 STERLING CHEMICALS INC 12/19/2002 4.98 BB 3.58 B- 
83 STRATOSPHERE CORPORATION 10/4/1998 8.16 AAA 8.56 AAA 
84 TELEMUNDO 7/20/1994 5.00 BB 4.98 BB 
85 TELETRAC INC 9/15/1999 3.82 B- 2.54 CCC 
86 VISTA EYECARE INC 5/31/2001 3.41 CCC+ 3.34 CCC+ 
87 WARNACO GROUP INC 1/16/2003 4.27 B 4.62 B+ 
       
 
NUMBER OF BANKRUPTCIES   81   82   
 
AVERAGE Z"-SCORE 
 
4.84 BB- 5.21 BB+ 
 
MEDIAN Z"-SCORE 
 
4.75 BB- 4.78 BB- 
 
STANDARD DEVIATION  1.83   3.74   
Sources: Author’s compilation from Capital IQ data and Bloomberg. 
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Since both categories comprise companies that have undergone an 
extensive restructuring, one might expect that their financial profiles upon 
emergence would resemble a going-concern, non-bankrupt entity. If, 
however, the model is effective in detecting future problems, we should 
find the average Z”-Score values of the Chapter 22 group will be 
significantly worse than among the Chapter 11s. 
In our samples, the effective confirmation dates of the bankruptcy 
reorganization plans for the eighty-one Chapter 11s was between 1993–
2009 (Figure 9). These companies were chosen based on data availability 
for calculating the Z”-Score distress prediction. Our objective here was to 
assemble a reasonably large, representative sample of industrial firms that 
had filed for bankruptcy and emerged as publicly held firms with post-
bankruptcy financial data available during roughly the same data period as 
our Chapter 22 sample. Our data source is New Generation Research for 
determining the Chapter 22, 33, or 44 status and the effective emergence 
date.46 For the sixty-one Chapter 22 firms in Figure 8, the effective date of 
emergence from their first bankruptcy was between 2003–10. The average 
time between emergence and the second filing was about four years and two 
months, and the median time was 3.5 years (Figure 8). The firms in both the 
Chapter 11 and 22 samples represent a broad cross-section of industries and 
asset sizes. 
A. POST-BANKRUPTCY DISTRESS PREDICTION RESULTS 
We can observe from Figures 8 and 10 that the average Z”-Score for 
our sample of sixty multi-filers just after emerging from Chapter 11 (one 
firm did not have sufficient data) was 2.39 (CCC BRE), and the median Z”-
Score was 3.02 (CCC+ BRE). The average score was slightly higher at 2.68 
(CCC) one year later (emerged +1). For the non-multi-filer sample of 
Chapter 11s, the average Z”-Score was 4.84 (BB- BRE) at emergence (t) 
and 5.21 (BB+) at t+1. The median was very close, at 4.75 at emergence 
and 4.78 at t+1, both at BB- BREs. These results are very similar to our 
earlier study’s, but our sample size was about 50% greater for our Chapter 
22s (60 versus 41) and much more than 50% greater for the list of Chapter 
11s (81 versus 45).47 For the sample of sixty Chapter 22s, 33s and 44s, 
sixteen had a financial profile upon emergence consistent with a “D” 
(default) rating equivalent, twenty-two with a CCC, and only twenty-two 
with a profile better than CCC; the latter two categories accounted for about 
37% of the sample. 
                                                                                                                                       
 46. New Generation Research, Inc., supra note 22. 
 47. See Altman et al., supra note 6. 
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FIGURE 10. Z”-SCORES FOR CHAPTER 22s – 
SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
 Emerge  
Emerge 
+1   
Time After Emergence to  
Next Filing 
Number of 
Bankruptcies 60  56   Years Months Days 
         
Average  
Z”-Score 2.39 CCC 2.68 CCC Avg. 4 1 29 
         
Median  
Z”-Score 3.02 CCC+ 2.70 CCC     
         
Standard 
Deviation 3.81  3.13      
Sources: Author’s compilation from Capital IQ data and Bloomberg. 
FIGURE 11. Z”-SCORES FOR CHAPTER 11s – 
SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
 Emerge BRE Emerge + 1 BRE 
Number of Bankruptcies 81  82  
Average Z”-Score 4.84 BB- 5.21 BB+ 
Median Z”-Score 4.75 BB- 4.78 BB- 
Standard Deviation 1.83  3.74  
Sources: Author’s compilation from Capital IQ data and Bloomberg. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE TEST RESULTS 
To examine more rigorously the statistical significance and importance 
of our average results for the two samples of post-bankruptcy performance, 
we performed a “difference in means t-test,” indicated in Figure 12. The 
two samples’ financial profiles were easily significant at the one-percent 
(.01) level (t=4.6 at emergence and 4.31 at t+1). So, these results had a very 
small likelihood of occurring by chance and are even more significant than 
the test results in our earlier study. 
FIGURE 12. DIFFERENCE IN MEANS TEST –  
CHAPTER 22 VERSUS CHAPTER 11 RESULTS 
 Z”-Score after 
Emergence 
Z”-Score 1-Year 
Post Emergence 
Chapter 11 Mean 4.84 5.21 
(Chapter 11 Standard Deviation) (1.83) (3.74) 
Chapter 22 Mean 2.39 2.68 
(Chapter 22 Standard Deviation) (3.81) (3.13) 
t-test* 4.61 4.31 
*𝑡 = 𝑋�11−𝑋�22
�
𝑉𝑎𝑟11
𝑛11
+
𝑉𝑎𝑟22
𝑛22
 
Sources: Figures 8 and 9. 
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C. IMPORTANCE OF A CCC (OR D) BRE 
If the post-emergence test indicates a D or CCC rating profile, we have 
major concerns about the feasibility of the POR. While skeptics could point 
out that about 37% of the Chapter 22 sample did not appear to be heading 
back to another bankruptcy, still almost two-thirds of the sample did, and a 
prudent analyst should be curious as to why these firms are likely to survive 
in the post-emergence period. About one-third or more of the Chapter 22 
sample had a CCC- rated profile upon emergence, and that could mean a 
survival experience. But, inspecting the mortality rates of CCC companies, 
as shown in the updated Mortality Rate calculations in Figure 13,48 a newly 
rated CCC bond has a greater than 50% (53.8% to be exact) likelihood of 
defaulting by the sixth year after the rating assignment date. These results 
are based on well over 2700 defaulting issues observations, covering the 
period of 1971–2013. Hence, again, a seemingly reasonable action is to 
raise the question of feasibility to those proposing the POR for firms with a 
CCC or D BRE. 
FIGURE 13. MORTALITY RATES BY ORIGINAL RATING – 
ALL RATED CORPORATE BONDSa (1971–2013) 
Years After Issuance 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
AAA Marginal 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.02% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
 Cumulative 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.03% 0.04% 0.04% 0.04% 0.04% 
AA Marginal 0.00% 0.00% 0.23% 0.09% 0.02% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.02% 0.01% 
 Cumulative 
0.00% 0.00% 0.23% 0.32% 0.34% 0.35% 0.36% 0.37% 0.39% 0.40% 
A Marginal 0.01% 0.04% 0.14% 0.15% 0.12% 0.08% 0.02% 0.27% 0.09% 0.06% 
 Cumulative 
0.01% 0.05% 0.19% 0.34% 0.46% 0.54% 0.56% 0.83% 0.92% 0.98% 
BBB Marginal 0.35% 2.40% 1.30% 1.02% 0.52% 0.25% 0.28% 0.16% 0.16% 0.34% 
 Cumulative 
0.35% 2.74% 4.01% 4.99% 5.48% 5.72% 5.98% 6.13% 6.28% 6.60% 
BB Marginal 0.96% 2.05% 3.92% 1.98% 2.35% 1.50% 1.48% 1.13% 1.47% 3.16% 
 Cumulative 
0.96% 2.99% 6.79% 8.64% 10.79% 12.12% 13.42% 14.40% 15.66% 18.33% 
B Marginal 2.88% 7.75% 7.88% 7.82% 5.72% 4.48% 3.58% 2.10% 1.78% 0.78% 
 Cumulative 
2.88% 10.41% 17.47% 23.92% 28.27% 31.49% 33.94% 35.33% 36.48% 36.97% 
CCC Marginal 8.20% 12.45% 17.95% 16.30% 4.70% 11.55% 5.40% 4.86% 0.70% 4.32% 
 Cumulative 
8.20% 19.63% 34.06% 44.80% 47.40% 53.47% 55.99% 58.13% 58.42% 60.22% 
a Rated by S&P at issuance. Based on 2644 issues. 
Sources: S&P and NYU Salomon Center 
D. WHAT ARE THE IMPEDIMENTS TO A SUCCESSFUL 
RESTRUCTURING? 
Skeptics to our statistically oriented proposal for post-emergence 
feasibility can point out that a myriad of uncontrollable events and 
exogenous factors may lead to recidivism. However, while these factors 
                                                                                                                                       
 48. Edward I. Altman, Measuring Corporate Bond Mortality and Performance, 44 J. FIN. 909 
(1989). 
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could materialize—such as a major economic downturn, industrial and 
product obsolescence, or political and regulatory changes, especially as the 
time from the initial emergence date increases beyond, say, five years—
there are still some obvious candidates to observe at the time of emergence 
to posit some prescriptive changes. Indeed, we observe two prime factors to 
question if the financial profile implicit in a POR looks out of line: initial 
profitability and leverage.  
Figure 14 shows the four Z”-Score variables’ averages for Chapter 22 
versus 11 filers upon emergence. Two of these four, the EBIT/TA and book 
equity/total liabilities, are significantly worse for our multi-filing sample of 
Chapter 22s than those for the Chapter 11 filing sample. Indeed, EBIT/TA 
remains negative (-0.05) for Chapter 22s, while it is slightly positive for 
Chapter 11s (Figure 14). While it is debatable whether the debtor firm can 
truly turn around operating results immediately after emerging, there is little 
question that post-emergence leverage can be adjusted. Our empirical 
results showed that creditors must continue to prefer debt in a post-Chapter 
11 scenario despite its burden to the debtor. We find that the equity/liability 
ratio of Chapter 22s was still quite leveraged at 0.24 versus 0.76 for the 
healthier Chapter 11 sample.49 So, while multiple-filers had debt/equity 
ratios of about 4.2:1, the single-filer Chapter 11 ratio was much lower at 
1.3:1. The results are even more significantly different than what we found 
in an earlier study on much smaller samples of Chapter 11 and 22 firms.50 
Despite a much more recent sample than what Gilson observed, results 
from this study are still consistent with his important findings.51 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
 49. t-tests were significant at the .01 level for X2, X3, and X4 for our two samples. 
 50. See Altman et al., supra note 6. 
 51. See Gilson, supra note 32. 
2014] Chapter 22 Phenomenon in the U.S. Bankruptcy System 273 
FIGURE 14. DIFFERENCE IN MEANS TEST OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
AND RISK LEVELS: CHAPTER 22 FIRMS VERSUS CHAPTER 11 
 
Chapter 11 
Sample (87) 
Standard 
Error 
Chapter 22 
Sample (61) 
Standard 
Error 
Difference in 
Means Test 
(t-test) 
X1 = Working 
Capital/TA 0.15 0.16 0.08 0.28 1.75* 
X2 = Retained 
Earnings/ TA -0.14 0.22 -0.36 0.39 4.00** 
X3 = EBIT/TA 0.01 0.07 -0.05 0.19 2.40** 
X4 = Book 
Equity / Total 
Liabilities 
0.76 1.08 0.24 0.39 4.16** 
Sources: Author’s calculations from firms listed in Figures 8 and 9 and Capital IQ. 
*Significant at .10 level 
**Significant at .01 level 
D. COMPARING POST-EMERGENCE SCORES AFTER ONE YEAR 
I thought it interesting to compare Z”-Scores just after emergence with 
the firms’ scores one year later to see if there was a high correlation. As 
expected, there was, with a multiple correlation of 74% and an R2 of 55% 
(0.546). So, not surprisingly, scores of companies just after emergence are 
highly consistent with later results. 
Finally, it was found that the higher the Z”-Score for firms that did 
refile, the longer it took for the second filing to take place. Those results 
were only mildly significant, however. The R2s were only 0.06 based on 
scores at t, and 0.20 (20%) based on scores at t+1, but in both cases the sign 
of the regression coefficient was positive—i.e., the higher the score, the 
longer it took for the second filing to take place. 
III. SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS AND STATEMENT 
We find that about 15% of all debtors who emerge from Chapter 11 
bankruptcy reorganization or are acquired during the process ultimately file 
again, highlighting the significant recidivism problem of our Chapter 11 
system. If one observes only the group that emerges as a continuing 
independent entity, the recidivism rate is more than 18%. While the 
majority of bankruptcy filings are initially successful (emerged or 
acquired), only in a little more than half of emergences, where the outcome 
is ultimately known, could one reasonably conclude that the result was truly 
successful. This is considerably less than the 65% success rate if one does 
not count the recidivism rate. I find the dismissal of these facts by many 
members of the bankruptcy community perhaps shortsighted, and to ignore 
the high recidivism rate is potentially dangerous to the very existence of the 
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system. Some meaningful analysis, and a constructive approach to limiting 
recidivism, would seem to be called for. We make one possible proposal to 
be considered. 
Using the Z”-Score model, I find that a large proportion of debtors 
filing a subsequent bankruptcy petition, usually another Chapter 11 but also 
a Chapter 7 liquidation, had a significantly worse financial profile upon 
emergence from the initial filing than those emerging as going concerns and 
not filing again. Indeed, the average financial profile and bond rating 
equivalent of the Z”-scores of the firms in the Chapter 22, 33, and 44 
sample, on emerging from their prior bankruptcy, were fairly similar to the 
way defaulting companies look just prior to default, i.e., with a CCC rating 
equivalent profile. 
We believe that a credible distress-prediction technique can be an 
important indicator of the future success of firms emerging from 
bankruptcy and could even be used as an independent technique by a court 
assessing the feasibility of a reorganization plan—a responsibility that is 
imbedded in the Bankruptcy Code. It could also be used by those 
responsible for devising the plan, especially if in identifying signs of 
continuing distress, they can make modifications. Creditors of the “old” 
company can use this technique, in addition to expected value metrics, in 
assessing the value of the new package of securities, including equity, 
offered in the plan. Finally, professional turnaround specialists can use this 
early-warning approach, or other distress prediction models, to assess the 
likelihood of their efforts succeeding. 
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APPENDIX A. CHAPTER 33s AND 44s 
Company 
Bankruptcy 
Date 
Confirmation 
Date Assets ($mm) 
Anchor Glass Container Corporation (2005) 08/08/05 04/18/06 657 
Anchor Glass Container Corporation (2002) 04/15/02 unknown unknown 
Anchor Glass Container Corporation (1996) 09/13/96 pending unknown 
Global Aviation Holdings, Inc. (2013) 11/12/13 pending 500 
Global Aviation Holdings, Inc. (2012) 02/05/12 12/10/12 690 
ATA Airlines, Inc. (2008) 04/02/08 03/26/09 250 
ATA Holdings Corp. (2004) 10/26/04 01/31/06 870 
Samuels Jewelers, Inc. (2003) 08/04/03 03/30/04 49 
Barry’s Jewelers, Inc. (1997) 05/11/97 12/22/98 146 
Barry’s Jewelers, Inc. (1992) 02/26/92 06/19/92 159 
Constar International Holdings, LLC (2013) 12/19/13 pending 50 
Constar International, Inc. (2011) 01/11/11 05/20/11 406 
Constar International, Inc. (2008) 12/30/08 05/14/09 472 
Filene’s Basement, LLC (Syms Corp.) (2011) 11/02/11 08/30/12 271 
Filene’s Basement, Inc. (2009) 05/04/09 01/26/10 80 
Filene’s Basement Corp. (1999) 08/23/99 10/23/00 203 
Grand Union Company, The (2000) 10/03/00 10/08/02 793 
Grand Union Company, The (1998) 06/24/98 08/05/98 1061 
Grand Union Company, The (1995) 01/25/95 05/31/95 1394 
Harvard Industries, Inc. (2002) 01/15/02 02/26/04 277 
Harvard Industries, Inc. (1997) 05/08/97 10/15/98 618 
Harvard Industries, Inc. (1991) 04/11/91 08/10/92 533 
Harvard Industries, Inc. (1972) 1972 unknown unknown 
PLVTZ, Inc. (Levitz Furniture) (2007) 11/08/07 pending 178 
Levitz Home Furnishings, Inc. (2005) 10/11/05 12/15/05 245 
Levitz Furniture, Inc. (1997) 09/05/97 12/15/00 934 
Loehmann’s Holdings, Inc. (2013) 12/15/13 pending unknown 
Loehmann’s Holdings, Inc. (2010) 11/15/10 02/09/11 204 
Loehmann’s, Inc. (1999) 05/18/99 09/06/00 189 
Memorex Telex Corporation (1996) 10/15/96 10/09/98 269 
Memorex Telex N.V. (1994) 02/11/94 03/14/94 1139 
Memorex Telex N.V. (1992) 01/06/92 02/07/92 1643 
Penn Traffic Company, The (2009) 11/18/09 10/27/10 194 
Penn Traffic Company, The (2003) 05/30/03 03/17/05 806 
Penn Traffic Company, The (1999) 03/01/99 05/27/99 1564 
Salant Corporation (1998) 12/29/98 04/16/99 233 
Salant Corporation (1990) 06/27/90 07/30/93 333 
Salant Corporation (1985) 02/22/85 05/19/87 95 
Sierra-Rockies Corporation (2003) 01/02/03 11/19/03 2 
Sierra-Rockies Corporation (2001) 02/02/01 unknown unknown 
Sierra-Rockies Corporation (1998) 05/28/98 unknown unknown 
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Sunshine Precious Metals, Inc. (2003) 05/27/03 unknown unknown 
Sunshine Mining and Refining Co. (2000) 08/23/00 12/05/00 37 
Sunshine Mining Company (1992) 03/09/92 08/26/92 222 
TerreStar Corporation (2011) 02/16/11 10/24/12 1376 
TerreStar Networks Inc. (2010) 10/19/10 02/15/12 1402 
Motient Corp. (2002) 01/10/02 04/26/02 1572 
Tetragenex Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (2010) 10/26/10 01/06/11 0.2 
Tetragenex Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (2009) 08/09/09 unknown 1 
Innapharma, Inc. (2003) 04/15/03 06/24/04 2 
Trans World Airlines, Inc. (2001) 01/10/01 06/18/02 2137 
Trans World Airlines, Inc. (1995) 06/30/95 08/04/95 2495 
Trans World Airlines, Inc. (1992) 01/31/92 08/11/93 2865 
Trump Entertainment Resorts, Inc. (2009) 02/17/09 05/07/10 2231 
Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc. (2004) 11/21/04 04/04/05 2031 
Trump Plaza Associates, LLC (1992) 03/09/92 05/05/92 396 
Trump Taj Mahal Associates, LLC (1991) 07/16/91 08/29/91 846 
Vertis Holdings, Inc. (2012) 10/10/12 pending 838 
Vertis Holdings, Inc. (2010) 11/17/10 12/16/10 1492 
Vertis, Inc. (2008) 07/15/08 08/26/08 528 
Sources: THE BANKRUPTCY YEARBOOK & ALMANAC, supra fig. 1; New Generation Research, Inc., 
supra note 22; compilation by E. Altman, NYU Salomon Center. 
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APPENDIX B. 2013 CHAPTER 22s: SIZE AND DURATION 
Company 
Bankruptcy 
Date 
Assets 
($ mm) 
Confirm 
Date 
Time Between Confirm 
& Second Filing 
Public/
Private 
Atlantic Express Transportation Corp. (2013) 11/04/13 100 n/a 10 years, 2 months n/a 
Atlantic Express Transportation Corp. (2002) 08/16/02 346.1 09/03/03  n/a 
Dex One Corp. (2013) 03/17/2013 2,835.4 04/29/13 3 years, 2 months Public 
R.H. Donnelley Corp. (2009) 05/28/2009 11,880.7 01/12/10  Public 
Eurofresh, Inc. (2013) 01/27/13 10.0 n/a 3 years, 3 months n/a 
Eurofresh, Inc. (2009) 04/21/09 172.7 10/27/09  Private 
Exide Technologies (2013) 06/10/13 2,195.0 n/a 9 years, 2 months n/a 
Exide Technologies, Inc. (2002) 04/14/02 2,298.9 04/21/04  Public 
FriendFinder Networks, Inc. (2013) 09/17/13 452.2 n/a 9 years, 1 month n/a 
General Media, Inc. (2003) 08/12/03 15.5 08/12/04  Private 
Furniture Brands Int’l, Inc. (2013) 09/09/13 618.4 n/a 21 years, 3 months n/a 
Interco, Inc. (1991) 01/24/91 1,148.3 6/25/92  Private 
Ormet Corp. (2013) 02/25/13 435.9 n/a 8 years, 3 months n/a 
Ormet Corp. (2004) 01/30/04 382.5 12/15/04  Public 
Pac-West Telecomm, Inc. (2013) 03/28/13 10.0 n/a 5 years, 4 months n/a 
Pac-West Telecomm, Inc. (2007) 04/30/07 79.3 11/19/07  Private 
Prologic Management Systems, Inc. (2013) 07/24/13 0.2  9 years, 5 months n/a 
Prologic Management Systems, Inc. (2004) 02/02/04 5.4 2/13/04  n/a 
RDA Holding Co. (Reader’s Digest) (2013) 02/17/13 1,564.1 n/a 3 years, 1 month Private 
Reader’s Digest Association, Inc., The (2009) 08/24/09 3,966.1 01/15/10  Private 
SuperMedia, Inc. (2013) 03/18/13 1,410.0 4/29/13 3 years, 3 months Public 
Idearc, Inc. (2009) 03/31/09 1,815.0 12/22/09  Public 
Source: New Generation Research, Inc., supra note 22. 
